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Abstract
The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions
about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their
mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present experiments, we investigated whether the mere belief that the
observed agent is an intentional system influences basic social attention mechanisms. We presented pictures of a human
and a robot face in a gaze cuing paradigm and manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by instruction:
in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a robot, in others, that they were observing
a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In conditions in which participants were made
to believe they were observing human behavior (intentional stance likely) gaze cuing effects were significantly larger as
compared to conditions when adopting the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a
human or a robot face was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others’
behavior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide striking evidence that
high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms of attentional selection in a top-down
manner.
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Introduction
Can we design machines that think? This old question has not
yet been settled, despite the progress in the fields of artificial
intelligence and cognitive science. For us humans, however,
equally important questions are: would we be inclined to treat
thinking artificial systems equally to other humans, and would we
be ready to engage in social interactions with non-human agents
that have minds? Alan Turing postulated that observed behavior is
the only source of information based on which we ascribe minds to
others [1]. Accordingly, for us to engage in social interactions, it
would be critical that we perceive other agents as thinking, whether
or not they actually have a mind.
In this paper, we ask a fundamental question, namely: would the
mere belief that an agent has a mind be sufficient to engage in
interactions with him/her in a social way, compared to if he/she
was believed to be just a machine. The belief that an agent has a
mind might lead us to adopt the intentional stance [2] towards him/
her, which involves ‘‘treating the object whose behavior you want
to predict as a rational agent with beliefs and desires and other
mental states’’ (Dennett, 2003, p. 372). Dennett argues that the
intentional stance is the best predictive strategy, given that the
system whose behavior we want to predict is truly intentional.
Throughout our lifelong experience with other humans, we have
learned that humans are truly intentional systems in this sense –
and, therefore, adopting the intentional stance towards human agents
should be more successful in predicting their behavior as
compared to adopting other strategies (e.g., the design or the
physical stance).
Importantly, adopting the intentional stance towards other
agents might not only be a successful predictive strategy, but also
play a decisive role for one’s own readiness to engage in social
interactions. For instance, if I believe that you are pointing to a
location with the intention of showing me something, I will be
likely to direct my attention there; but I will be unlikely to attend
to where a lever of a broken machine is pointing, as I will not
interpret the lever’s behavior as conveying communicative content
[3,4]. The present study was designed to investigate the
fundamental issue of whether a belief concerning the minds of
others has an impact on basic mechanisms underlying social
cognition.
Understanding Others’ Behavior in Social Interactions
On the neuronal level, interpreting others’ intentions is
supported by a system consisting of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
superior temporal sulcus (STS), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), amygdala and
anterior insula [5,6,7]. Furthermore, activation in the anterior
paracingulate cortex has been reported to be related specifically to
the adoption of the intentional stance [8]. At the cognitive level of
description, Baron-Cohen [9] has postulated that higher-level
processes of mental-state attribution (Theory of Mind, ToM) are
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informed by low-level perceptual mechanisms: the Intentionality
Detector (ID) and the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD).
Although the interpretation of social scenes involves low-level
perceptual processes, it is unlikely that information is fed forward
unidirectionally to higher-level processes of mental-state attribu-
tion, as everyday interactions require mechanisms that modulate
perceptual information according to its social relevance. For these
reasons, Teufel and colleagues [10,11,12] proposed that low-level
processes not only inform higher-level processes but are themselves
modulated by the latter, that is: specifying particular mental states
requires the integration of bottom-up information provided by the
stimulus and top-down information reflecting various context
variables. In support of this view, Teufel and colleagues [11]
reported that adaptation to gaze direction depended on whether
participants believed that the observed person could actually or
could not see through a pair of goggles.
Reading Out Others’ Mental States Based on Gaze
Direction
Gaze direction provides the basis for making inferences about
the other’s focus of interest, and encourages the observer to shift
attention to the corresponding location [13]. Attention shifts
triggered by gaze direction are typically investigated using a gaze-
cuing paradigm [14], in which a schematic face is presented
centrally on the screen that gazes either straight ahead or to the
left or right. Targets appearing in the gaze-cued hemifield are
detected, localized, and discriminated more rapidly compared to
targets in the opposite, uncued hemifield.
Orienting attention in response to perceived gaze direction has
traditionally been regarded as a reflexive, bottom-up process
involved in making inferences about the other’s mental states [15].
In line with this view, children as young as three months have been
found to attend more quickly to peripheral objects that are gazed
at by a human face compared to objects not directly gazed at [16].
Moreover, adult participants have been found to reflexively orient
attention in the direction of another’s gaze even when gaze cues
are counterpredictive of the target location [17], whereas they
voluntarily orient away from counterpredictive arrows [18] or
extended tongues [19].
However, although gaze-cuing has been shown to be triggered
in a bottom-up fashion, a growing body of evidence suggests that
attending to where others gaze is not purely reflexive, but can
rather be modulated by higher-level cognitive processes. For
instance, Ristic and Kingstone [20] presented participants with an
ambiguous stimulus that could be perceived as either a car with
wheels or a face with a hat, and manipulated their beliefs by
instruction; the stimulus was found to cue participants’ attention
only when they believed that they were looking at a face, rather
than at a car. Similarly, Kawai [21] found that schematic faces
caused gaze-cuing effects only when participants believed that a
potential target was visible to the gazer, but not when it was
occluded.
Aim of Study
The present study was designed to address a more fundamental
issue, namely, whether adopting the intentional stance based on a
mere belief concerning the observed agent would affect basic
mechanisms of social attention. In classical studies examining the
processes involved in inferring others’ mental states [22,23],
participants are typically observing intentional agents and asked to
provide a description of the agents’ behavior making use of
mentalistic vocabulary. Similarly, in the studies of Teufel and
colleagues [11,12], participants were always observing intentional
agents exhibiting particular mental states (such as being either able
or unable to see through a pair of goggles). However, inferring
particular mental states from observed behavior presupposes that
the agent is construed as an intentional system that is capable of
having intentions. Given this, based on previous studies, one
cannot decide whether basic mechanisms of social perception and
attention were influenced by adopting the intentional stance per se,
rather than by processes of reasoning about particular mental states.
For resolving this fundamental issue, it is important to examine
whether the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance per se (i.e.,
assuming that the observed agent has mental states) has an effect
on one’s own social cognition.
Thus, critically, we distinguish between processes of mentalizing
about others’ internal states and adopting the intentional stance. The
former involves an active process of reasoning about mental states
that underlie particular behavior, whereas the latter is, funda-
mentally, a result of activating a set of pre-existing representations
of what it means to be ‘‘a human’’, which contains – amongst
others – properties like ‘‘having a mind’’ or ‘‘being capable of
having intentions. By contrast, a representation of a mechanistic
device (such as a robot) is probably devoid of mind-related
characteristics. Thus, when predicting and/or explaining behavior
of observed systems, humans either adopt the intentional stance or
use other predictive strategies (such as the design or physical
stances), dependent on the activated representations. In sum,
adopting the intentional stance is based on a decision as to whether
or not an observed agent is capable of having intentions;
mentalizing, by contrast, is concerned with reasoning about what
specific intentions are underlying behavior displayed by an agent
that has already been classified as having a mind.
Experiments
In three experiments, we investigated whether social attention is
modulated by the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance. To
this end, we used two different types of gazers to orient
participants’ attention in a gaze-cuing paradigm: either a human
face or a robot face (see Figure 1A). The likelihood of adopting the
intentional stance was manipulated by instruction rather than by
the appearance of the gazer (see [8]). In Experiment 1,
participants were instructed (Instruction 1) that they would observe
either a human (intentional stance likely) or a robot (intentional stance
unlikely). In Experiment 2, Instruction 2 informed participants that
they were observing a human or a robot whose gaze behavior was
controlled by a human (intentional stance likely in both cases), while in
Instruction 3 participants were told they would be observing a
human-like mannequin or a robot (intentional stance unlikely in either
case). In both experiments, participants had to perform a target
discrimination task. To ensure that variations of gaze-cuing effects
could not be attributed to physical differences between stimuli, the
same stimuli were used for all experimental groups. On the
intentional-stance hypothesis, we expected to find stronger gaze-
cuing effects for stimuli representing intentional agents (Experiment.
1: human; Experiment 2, Instruction 2: human and robot) relative to
stimuli representing agents who were less likely to be treated as
intentional systems (Experiment 1: robot; Experiment 2, Instruction
3: human and robot). Please note that our paradigm did not involve
actual social interaction. That is, participants observed only
photographs representing either intentional or non-intentional
agents. Yet, we believe that it is still possible to adopt the
intentional stance towards virtual humans. For example, when one
watches a movie, one predicts behavior of characters depicted in
that movie by adopting the intentional stance, even though one is
not actually interacting with the characters. At the same time one
might not adopt the intentional stance to a virtual robot due to
pre-existing representation of what a robot is Experiment 3
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examined whether the effects in question are generalizable to tasks
with different attentional demands. 1. The pattern of results
revealed in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in Experiment 3
(localization task), which is reported in the supporting information
section (Text S1). Please see also Figure S1 and Table S1.
Materials and Methods
Participants
24 participants participated in Experiment 1 (15 women;
mean age: 25 years (M=25.25, range: 19–32), two left-handed). In
Experiment 2, 48 participants were randomly assigned to two
groups with different instructions: Instruction 2 (human – human
controlled robot): 16 women; mean age: 23 years (M=23.17,
range: 18–30) and Instruction 3 (human-like mannequin, robot): 18
women; mean age: 23 years (M=22.58, range: 18–30). Partici-
pants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Testing time was about 40 minutes. One participant had to be
excluded from Experiment 1 because of significantly increased
error rates compared to other participants (M=16.7% compared
to M=4.7%); one participant was excluded from Experiment 2
(Instruction 2) because the participant did not complete the
experiment.
Ethics Statement
The experiments were conducted at the Department of
Experimental Psychology at the LMU Munich, where all
experimental procedures with purely behavioral data collection
(e.g., RTs and error rates) of healthy adult participants, that do not
include invasive or potentially dangerous methods are approved
by the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, LMU
Munich, in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data were stored
and analyzed anonymously. Participants gave their informed
consent and were either paid or received course credit for
participating.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. Graphics Series G90fB
monitor with the refresh rate set at 85 Hz. RT measures were
based on standard keyboard responses. Participants were seated
approximately 57 cm from the monitor, and the experimenter
ensured that participants were centered with respect to the
monitor. The experiment was controlled by Experiment Builder (SR
Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada).
Stimuli
In the human condition, digitized photos of a female face (F 07)
were used as stimuli, chosen from the Karolinska Directed Emotional
Faces database [24]. We have received written informed consent
(as outlined in the PloS consent form) from Karolinska Institute
(Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Section Psychology) to use
the photograph (F 07) for experimental investigation and
illustration of the stimuli in publications. In the robot condition,
photos of a humanoid robot (EDDIE; developed by TU Munich) were
used. Stimuli were 6.4u wide and 10.0u high, depicted on a white
background and presented in full frontal orientation with eyes
positioned on the central horizontal axis of the screen (Figure 1A).
For left- and rightward gaze, irises and pupils in the eyes were
shifted with PhotoshopTM and deviated 0.4u from direct gaze. The
target stimulus was a black capital letter (F or T), measuring 0.8u in
width and 1.3u in height. Targets appeared on the horizontal axis,
located 6.0u from the center of the screen.
Procedure
Figure 1B illustrates the sequence of events in the present
experiments. The beginning of every trial was signaled by a
fixation cross at the center of the screen. 1000 ms later, a face with
straight gaze appeared on the screen while the fixation cross
remained in its position. After a random time interval of 700 to
1000 ms, gaze either remained straight or was shifted left- or
rightwards. Following the gaze cue with a SOA of 500 ms, the
target letter appeared either on the left or the right side of the
screen. SOA was measured as the interval between the onset of the
Figure 1. Stimuli and trial sequence. Pictures for the Robot and Human Gazer are shown in (A). The sequence of events within a trial is shown in
(B). The human face (F 07) is taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database [24]. We have received written informed consent (as
outlined in the PLoS consent form) from Karolinska Institute (Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Section Psychology) to use the photograph for
experimental investigations and illustration of the stimuli in publications. The picture of the robot face is made by LSR (TU Munich) and depicts the
research robot EDDIE (made by LSR, TU Munich).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045391.g001
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gaze shift to the onset of the target. Face and target remained on
the screen until a response was given or after 1200 ms had elapsed.
The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was 680 ms.
At the beginning of each session, participants were told to fix
their gaze on a centrally presented cross. They were also instructed
that after the fixation cross a photo of either a human or a robot
would appear in the center of the screen but that they should still
keep their eyes fixated on the fixation cross. Further, participants
were advised that after its initial presentation the face gaze could
remain straight or shifted left- or rightwards, subsequently
followed by a target letter. Participants were asked to respond to
target identity as quickly and as accurately as possible. For half of
the participants F was assigned to the ‘‘D’’ key and T to the ‘‘K’’
key on the keyboard, for the other half of the participants stimulus-
response mapping was reversed. The key labels were covered with
a sticker to prevent letter interference effects. All instructions were
given in a written form and the experimenter was not informed
about the purposes of this experiment.
Each session of the experiment was composed of 500 trials, with
a block of 20 practice trials preceding 10 experimental blocks of 48
trials each. Gaze direction (straight, left, right), target side (left,
right), target identity (F, T) and cue identity (human, robot) were
selected pseudo-randomly and every combination appeared with
equal frequency. Gaze direction was manipulated orthogonal to
target position: that is, in one third of the trials, gaze was directed
to the side on which the target appeared (valid), in another third of
the trials to the other side (invalid) and in another third of the trials,
the face was gazing straight ahead (neutral).
Analysis
Gaze-cuing effects were examined by comparing valid vs.
invalid trials, i.e., in terms of costs-plus-benefits (invalid-valid)
rather than benefits (neutral-valid) and costs (invalid-neutral) with
respect to the neutral condition. This was done because the latter
condition may not provide an adequate baseline measure for the
separate assessment of cuing effects [25]. In fact, in all conditions
of the present study, neutral trials were found to elicit longer RTs
than valid and invalid trials – for two likely reasons: (i) straight-
ahead gaze might have a holding effect on attention [26], making
it difficult for the target onset to disengage attention and summon
an orienting response (in line with [27]); (ii) with straight-ahead
gaze being maintained in the neutral condition, there was no
similar temporal warning-signal effect to that induced by the gaze
shift in valid and invalid conditions. In this regard, gaze cuing
paradigms with naturalistic faces differ from those with schematic
faces [14]: in the latter, trials typically start with face-like stimuli in
which the eyes contain no pupils; pupils appear only later, so that
also straight-ahead gaze involves a visual change that can serve as
a temporal warning signal. This is not done with naturalistic faces
[28], as empty eyes without pupils are thought to be emotionally
disturbing, potentially interfering with attentional orienting.
Results
Experiment 1
Missed (0.69%), and incorrect responses (3.69%), as well as RTs
deviating by more than 62.5 SD from individual participants’
means were removed prior to analyses. The statistical analyses
Figure 2. Size of gaze cuing effects as function of Cue Type and Instruction. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean adjusted to
within-subject designs (see [40]). *p,.05, **p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045391.g002
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focused on the conditions of interest: mean RTs on valid versus
invalid trials as a function of cue type (human vs. robot). Results of
statistical analyses for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are
presented in Table 1, along with Mean RTs and Standard Errors.
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding gaze-cuing effects (DRTinvalid-
valid) for both types of cue; for the results of Experiment 1, see the
top row in Table 1 and the left-hand side of Figure 2.
A two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of
mean RTs with the factors cue validity (valid, invalid) and cue-type
(human, robot) revealed the main effect of validity
[F(1,22) = 22.131, p,.001, gp
2 = .501] to be significant: valid trials
yielded faster responses than invalid trials (449 ms vs. 458 ms).
Importantly, the interaction between validity and cue-type was
significant [F(1,22) = 14.113, p,.002, gp
2 = .391]: under Instruc-
tion 1, gaze-cuing effects were twice as strong for the human
(DRT= 14 ms, [t(22) = -5.954, p,.001]) as for the robot
(DRT= 5 ms, [t(22) = -2.211, p,.04]), though reliable in both
conditions. The main effect of cue-type (454 ms for the human
vs. 453 ms for the robot) was not significant [F(1,22) = .017 p..8,
gp
2 = .001].
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to further investigate the influence
of adopting the intentional stance on gaze-cuing, independently of
the physical characteristics of the stimuli. To realize this, stimuli
were kept the same across conditions, while instruction was
manipulated: Instruction 2– human versus robot controlled by
human (intentional stance likely) and Instruction 3– human-like
mannequin versus robot (intentional stance unlikely). The setup was
comparable to Experiment 1, with one exception: in order to
investigate the temporal dynamics of attentional orienting in
response to gaze cues, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
between cue and target presentation was varied: SOA was either
short (250 ms) or long (600 ms).
Missed (0.44%) and incorrect responses (4.20%) as well as
outliers (62.5 SD from individual participants’ means) were
excluded from analysis. For the results of Experiment 2, see the
middle (Instruction 2) and bottom (Instruction 3) rows in Table 1
and the middle (Instruction 2) and right-hand sides (Instruction 3)
of Figure 2. Mean RTs were examined in a mixed-design ANOVA
with the between-subject factor instruction (Instruction 2, Instruc-
tion 3) and the within-subjects factors SOA (250 ms, 600 ms),
validity (valid, invalid), and cue-type (human, robot). Results of
statistical analyses for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are
summarized in Table 1. As SOA did not interact with any effects of
interest, all Fs ,1.3, ps ..2, data were collapsed over this factor.
Again, there was a main effect of validity [F(1,45) = 33.790,
p,.001, gp
2 = .429], with shorter RTs for valid relative to invalid
trials (452 ms vs. 461 ms), and no main effect of cue type (457 ms
for the human vs. 456 ms for the robot, [F(1,45) = .641, p..4,
gp
2 = .014]). Most importantly, the interaction between validity
and instruction was significant [F(1,45) = 11.087, p,.003,
gp
2 = .02]: gaze-cuing effects were larger when adopting the
intentional stance was likely (DRT= 14 ms for the human and
DRT= 15 ms for the robot) compared to when this was unlikely
(DRT= 4 ms for the human and for the robot). Note that this effect
was independent of cue-type, as evidenced by a non-significant
interaction between instruction, validity, and cue-type
[F(1,45) = .012, p..9, gp
2,.001]. No other effect reached signif-
icance [F,.02, p..8].
Comparisons Across Experiments
To compare gaze-cuing effects among all three instructions and
cue-types, post-hoc t-tests (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple
comparisons) were conducted. Comparisons confirmed that the
size of the gaze-cuing effect was not influenced by the cue-type as
such (human vs. robot), but only by the likelihood of adopting the
intentional stance towards the cue provider. In more detail, gaze-
cuing effects did not differ between human and robot in conditions
in which participants believed they observed either human
behavior (Experiment 1, human: DRT= 14 ms, vs. Experiment
2, Instruction 2, robot: DRT= 15 ms; [t(44) = -.094, p..9]) or non-
human behavior (Experiment 1, robot: DRT= 5 ms, vs. Experi-
ment 2, Instruction 3, human: DRT= 4 ms; [t(45) = .328, p..7]).
But the same cue-type elicited cuing effects of different sizes
depending on whether or not the intentional stance was likely to be
adopted towards the cue provider (Experiment 1, human:
DRT= 14 ms, vs. Experiment 2, Instruction 3, human:
DRT= 4 ms [t(45) = 2.727, p,.01]; Experiment 2, Instruction 2,
robot: DRT= 15 ms, vs. Experiment 1, robot: DRT= 5 ms;
[t(44) = 2.644, p,.02]).
Discussion
The present study investigated whether the mere belief that the
observed stimulus is representing an agent with a mind influences
basic social attention mechanisms, as measured by gaze-cuing
effects. Rather than solely manipulating perceptual aspects of the
cue provider [28–30], we varied participants’ beliefs about the
gazer through instruction (while keeping the stimuli constant). We
hypothesized that gaze-cuing would be increased when adopting
the intentional stance was likely, whatever the identity of the gazer.
Our findings clearly support this hypothesis: while both human
and robot induced attention shifts to gazed-at positions, cuing
effects were twice as large when adopting the intentional stance
towards the gazer was likely, as compared to when this was
unlikely. In particular, gaze-cuing effects were significantly smaller
for the robot than for the human when no explicit instruction was
provided. Importantly, however, the same stimuli elicited gaze-
cuing effects to varying degrees when different beliefs were
induced: the human face condition yielded reduced cuing effects
(comparable to the robot condition) when it was believed to
represent a mannequin, while the robot face elicited enhanced
Table 1. Mean RTs and SEM (in ms) as a function of cue validity and instruction, for human and robot cues.
Human Robot Statistics
Valid Invalid Neutral Valid Invalid Neutral Cue type6Validity
Instruction 1 447 (10) 461 (11) 479 (10) 451 (11) 456 (12) 481 (11) F(2,44) = 3.7, p,.05
Instruction 2 454 (12) 469 (13) 482 (12) 453 (12) 467 (12) 484 (12) F(2,44) = 0.1, p.0.8
Instruction 3 451 (11) 455 (12) 474 (12) 450 (11) 454 (11) 477 (13) F(2,46) = 0.4, p.0.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045391.t001
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cuing effects (comparable to the human condition) when it was
believed to be controlled by a human. The results of Experiment 3
show that this pattern is robust, generalizing to other tasks with
very different attentional demands, such as target localization [31].
This pattern of results shows that basic social attention
mechanisms are modulated by the observers’ beliefs, induced
solely by instruction, about whether or not the cue provider
represents an intentional system. That is, social attention
mechanisms are modulated fundamentally by the observer
adopting the intentional stance towards others, rather than simply
by attributing particular mental states [10–12,21].
Reflexive Behavior under the Control of Beliefs
The present results provide evidence that attentional orienting
in response to gaze direction is not purely reflexive, but prone to
top-down modulation induced by higher-level cognitive processes.
That is, gaze direction triggers social attention mechanisms based
on a combination of two components: a bottom-up component
that reflexively directs attention to where others are looking, and a
top-down component that incorporates social context information
relating to the observed scene into attentional guidance. In the
present study, the bottom-up component produced a weak
attentional bias towards stimuli at the gazed-at location, whether
or not participants construed the cue provider as an intentional
agent (in line with [29,30]). The top-down component came into
play in conditions in which adopting the intentional stance
towards the cue provider was likely. Thus, attentional mechanisms
involved in low-level processes of social perception not only
influence, but are themselves influenced by beliefs humans hold
about social stimuli they observe (in line with [10–12]). Interac-
tions between lower- and higher-level processes are also supported
by neuroimaging evidence: while the STS appears to trigger
bottom-up responses to social signals, top-down control of these
responses is thought to originate from the mPFC, adapting the
system to the social context of the scene [32–34].
In this context, it is important to distinguish between i) reflexive
vs. top-down modulated shifts of attention on the side of the
observer; and ii) reflexive vs. intentional shifts of gaze on the side of
the gazer. As discussed, the present data show that attentional
shifts on the side of the observer are due to a reflexive mechanism
that can be modulated by top-down component. At the same time,
one needs to note that the gaze shifts on the side of the gazer can
also be either reflexive (due to attentional orienting to a salient
event in the periphery) or intentional, i.e., carrying social
communicative content (the gazer shifts his/her gaze to the
periphery in order to communicate a certain intention to the
observer). The manipulation in the present study was concerned
rather with the latter, as there was no salient event in the periphery
that the gazer could reflexively shift gaze to. Therefore, we discuss
the results in the context of intentional gaze behavior on the side of
the gazer.
Humans do not Engage in Social Interactions with Just
Any Agent
The finding that social attention processes are modulated by
adopting the intentional stance when observing others’ behavior
raises a fundamental question: why does the belief that another
agent is an intentional system influence the way we allocate
attentional resources? Clearly, an attentional system that is
sensitive to social context information is highly advantageous
from an evolutionary perspective: it permits adaptation to the
social relevance of the scenario in which an interaction takes place.
Allocating attention to where another person is attending serves
the purpose of establishing shared intentionality [4], which enables us
to engage in collaborative activities by sharing goals, intentions,
knowledge, and beliefs with others. The present results suggest that
humans opt to engage in shared intentionality only with those who
are believed to have intentions and are expected to display
predictable, goal-oriented behavior. Given this, humans might be
reluctant to adopt the intentional stance when observing a robot as
compared to other humans. Importantly, what is crucial for
adopting the intentional stance and, as a result, for readiness to
engage in social interaction is not whether the observed agent
actually has mental states, but whether the agent is believed to have
mental states.
Interestingly in this context, there have been several reports
[35–39] that humans tend to provide mentalistic descriptions of
the behavior of simple geometrical figures in dynamic motion
scenarios. However, participants in those studies may not have
actually adopted the intentional stance towards the observed
stimuli, but only described behavior using mentalistic vocabulary –
similarly to when one says ‘‘my computer did not want to start’’.
Alternatively, participants may have adopted the intentional
stance by treating the geometric figures as representations of
intentional agents – in a similar way to the present study where
the robot was instructed to be controlled by a human. Hence, the
novelty of our study is that through instruction manipulation, we
triggered the activation of preexisting representations of the
observed agents: the representation of a human as being an
intentional agent, versus that of a robot being a mechanistic, non-
intentional object. These representations in turn modulated the
degree to which social attention mechanisms were employed.
Consequently, if humans tend not to adopt the intentional
stance towards robots, they would ascribe less social relevance to its
behavior compared to that displayed by humans. Hence, the
present findings are not only of theoretical interest, but are also of
significance to applied domains in which artificial systems are to be
involved in interactions with humans (e.g., social robotics). If
attribution of mental states is a crucial factor for enabling efficient
social interactions, social robotics might need to address the issue
of humans being hesitant to adopt the intentional stance towards a
robot.
Concluding Remarks
The present findings indicate that a mere belief that the observed
agent represents a human triggers the concept of an intentional agent,
and encourages adopting the intentional stance – in contrast to
when the observed agent is believed to represent a mechanistic
system (e.g., a robot). Consequently, social attention mechanisms
are more readily employed when the intentional stance is adopted.
This seems plausible, especially given that two types of intentions
are communicated through gaze behavior that leads to directing
others’ attention [4]: referential – what is the object of attention; and
social – why do I direct your attention to this object? If an observer
believes that the latter component is missing and is not convinced
that the observed agent is capable of communicating social
intentions, he/she might allocate attention to a lesser degree to the
gazed-at object. On this basis, we propose that adopting the
intentional stance plays a pivotal role in basic attention
mechanisms involved in social interactions. For us humans to
recruit these mechanisms, it seems not to matter whether the
observed agents can actually think – but rather whether we believe
they do!
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